Blackstone's Commentaries are hardly untrodden turf, which means that a project like Prest's is haunted by the possibility that it is actually quite difficult to tell readers anything they don't already know. The first volume hovered a little uncertainly between the historical and the legal. Essays dealt with a variety of subjects: Blackstone's life and character; the nature and sources of the jurisprudence on display in his Commentaries; reactions to the Commentaries at home (notably from the acerbic Jeremy Bentham, who has the volume's second longest index entry after Sir William himself) and overseas (the United States, France and Germany); and the long half-life of the Commentaries in juridical usage. It concluded with two short essays on bibliographic and iconographic sources. By comparison, the second volume has tried quite hard to stake out a different and more focused terrain, which one might best describe as 'beyond …'. In matters of interpretation, essayists move beyond legal analysis and legal history to literary criticism and art history. In assessing the Commentaries' dissemination and impact, they pursue Blackstone beyond the usual
II Words and VIsIons
First, how were the Commentaries composed? In the initial volume of essays Carol Mathews called attention to the centrality of architecture to Blackstone's life, and to the place of architectural and spatial metaphor in the Commentaries. Blackstone's father, a London textile merchant, died in debt, hampering his wife, who also died in straitened circumstances. William became dependent upon the largesse of his maternal family. Prest provides some details of his income in the pre-Commentaries years, but not systematically. Beginning his life with essentially nothing, Blackstone's estate at his death was worth £25 000 in 1781, or approximately US$4.2 million in current money (A$6.0 million). In 1761, when he acquired the house, it appears he was already worth some £1500 (US$310 000 current, A$440 000 
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'Words and Visions' (the title of part one of the volume), Martinez argues that Blackstone was committed to a deeply visual conception of orderliness expressed initially in youthful architectural drawing (and verse 10 ) and transposed to the Commentaries through tabular arrangement of topics, classification schemes and schematic diagrams. 'Blackstone strove to render law's connections visible, connections which, to this point, had remained mostly visible and unseen'. 11 But his aesthetic was that of the artist rather than the common lawyer, leading him to sacrifice detail ('the law as it really was' 12 ) that might complicate or otherwise spoil the overall image he desired to create. It was, moreover, a decidedly rule-bound aesthetic: 13 According to Meehan, the much-remarked literary effectiveness of the Commentaries lay in taking on both the style and substance of the English georgics, offering 'a postpastoral vision of the world in which nature must be enhanced and only fully "possessed" through human labour, and through an extension of knowledge'. 20 Blackstone represented law in the service of georgic achievement, labouring over centuries to restore a fallen world from 'ignorance and fragmentation', an ordered totality possessed of a mind and a voice of its own, a living entity whose wise and solicitous designs underpinned 'the "present Glory" of the English legal establishment '. 21 To this secular analysis one should add the undoubted influence of Blackstone's deep, even fervent (in his youth at least) commitments to establishment Anglicanism. 22 In Cairns, above n 34, 93. For the passage in question see Blackstone, above n 2, vol I, 411-13.
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In a commentary on Cairns' essay, Stephen Sheppard finds Cairns' argument 'state of the art', and adds information on the rising incidence of citation of Blackstone in antebellum Louisiana reported opinions. 40 How does one reconcile this with the Francophile claim of Louisiana's civilian exceptionalism from the rest of the common law United States? The claim, Sheppard concludes, overstates its case -the civilian claim has camouflaged legal-cultural reality, 'which is one of quiet common law integration'. 41 Michael Morin's essay on 'Blackstone and the Birth of Quebec's Distinct Legal Culture 1765-1867' finds in Quebec something of the same civil law/common law admixture on display in Louisiana, albeit one that emerged out of different circumstances and that has retained a distinct expression. Notwithstanding disavowal of 'the Laws and usages established for this country' in favour of Crown supremacy in the terms of capitulation of New France to the English in 1760, French private law continued in practical effect alongside English criminal law, surviving even the terms of the royal proclamation of 1763 creating the province of Quebec under English law. 42 After ten years of debate over the implementation of the royal proclamation, the Quebec Act 1774 (Imp) 14 Geo III c 83 formally 'reinstated the rules relating to property and civil rights applied in New France', while also providing for the continuation of English criminal law. The Quebec Act also safeguarded Catholic civil and religious rights, subject to an oath of allegiance intended to preserve the supremacy of the Crown. Morin points to this overall outcome -'freedom of belief and worship for Catholics' alongside royal supremacy over spiritual and temporal affairs -as in accordance with Blackstone's ideas; an acknowledgement, in effect, of the familiar contention that 'in conquered or ceded countries, that have already laws of their own, the king may indeed alter and change those laws; but, till he does actually change them, the antient laws of the country remain, unless such as are against the law of God'. 43 Quebec's subsequent history through Confederation in 1867 and beyond shows consistent adherence to a hybrid legal culture -the civil law tradition in private law and the common in administrative and criminal law. Morin argues on the basis of bibliographic evidence that in the development of the hybrid the Commentaries became, even before translation, 'a very useful tool … a standard reference work on the political system of England and its criminal laws'. 
48
Ibid 138. Even usage of the Commentaries as an empirical sourcebook of the law as it was 'then', Allen argues, is controversial. After all, Blackstone's were quite literally 'commentaries' on the laws of England rather than reproductions. In the process of organising and synthesising he engaged, quite busily, in the creation of legal and historical mythology. 66 Even if Blackstone were a preeminent authority for lawyers and judges during the era of the Revolution and the Early Republic (and of course he was not treated as such by all, by any means), 67 that cannot be taken to signify their universal, uncritical acceptance of his text as 'an objective, politically neutral description of the common law of their time'. 68 And of course one may take the matter of the factual still further, for the legal culture of the early United States was formed by the quotidian habits and customs of the crowd at least as much as by the imaginings and practices of the comparatively tiny establishment of legal elites. 69 The Commentaries may have helped to convey Roscoe Pound's 'taught legal tradition' from one side of the ocean to the other, but one must be deeply sceptical of any attempt to represent a work entitled 'Commentaries on the Laws of England' as empirically authoritative when it comes to the inestimably plural legal cultures of Revolutionary and Early Republican America. 70 The distinction drawn in Jessie Allen's essay between myth and fact points not to a divergence between representation and reality, words and things, but rather to two distinct realities both created by text. After all, in the Commentaries both 'the factual' and 'the mythical' are facets of textual representation. Historians usually invoke context to distinguish between a text's truth content and its mythic content, 
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but context does not assist us in distinguishing the oracular Blackstone from the rapporteur in situations in which -as in the genealogy of originalism -the text is treated as an authoritative guide to its context (English common law culture) rather than vice versa. Paul Halliday notes the quandary in his essay, 'Blackstone's King'. For over 200 years, he says, we have treated the Commentaries like 'some kind of jurisprudential inkblot' 71 into which virtually anything can be read precisely because the Commentaries are self-authorising. Halliday does not respond by attempting to contextualise the Commentaries. Rather, his approach is to treat them as what they are -a text created by an author who, 'ever the poet, attentive to the plasticity of words', was actively engaged in the making of meaning. 72
Halliday's muse in the exercise is what the Commentaries had to say about the king. He argues that Blackstone's poetics of kingship are self-consciously ironic, invoking Hayden White's description of irony as 'catachresis (literally "misuse"), the manifestly absurd Metaphor designed to inspire Ironic second thoughts about the nature of the thing characterized' that presupposes 'the reader or auditor already knows, or is capable of recognizing, the absurdity of the characterization'. 73 One pauses to wonder whether Temple's dysfluent Blackstone would have risked irony in lecture -irony is often lost on a live audience -but Halliday's focus here is on the text of the Commentaries, susceptible to repeated readings. His particular focus is the Commentaries' trope of the king's sacredness. His argument is that Blackstone knowingly cast before his readers a figuration of the king that was 'not a description of the centre of their legal-political world' but rather a means by which claims about that centre could be criticised and its realities understood. 'Blackstone presented a sacred king only to disembody him, reducing him to acting through a metonym of himself: through a "crown" that had entirely absorbed those attributes once associated with the "king"'. 74 How was this reduction undertaken? By law. It was the law that ascribed sacredness to the king, that invested in the king 'supreme executive power' with all the rights and prerogatives of sovereignty, and to which the king in performance of his duties to care for and protect the community was subservient. Halliday's point is that Sir Edward Coke's king, whose natural body was that to which natural subjects were bound in allegiance, had been entirely absorbed into his immortal body politic, 'framed by the policy of man', renamed 'the crown', and bound by law. If law was what bound, words (text) were law's signifying force. Blackstone's argument 'was not simply that the prerogative, in his own age, had "limits" and that those might be discussed. Rather, he understood that acts of discussion, including his own, constituted those limits. His pen drew the bounds around the king'. 76 So doing, Blackstone gave the controlling law textual body. As the King's natural body evaporated into 'the crown', words reshaped the crown into the 18 th century constitutional mixture of legislative and executive: the ministry sitting in parliament, office-holders and bureaucracy, army: 'the political-legal order in its entirety', or in other words the state, the collective 'being through which law now thought, felt, and acted'. 77 Halliday detects a certain anxiety in the 'republican' Blackstone that in absorbing the king, and in the process becoming the fountain of the law that had evaporated the king, the crown had corrupted itself, that it would not care for the community as the unbound king had done. 78 Was Blackstone's lost king a patriot king? Halliday does not say, at least not directly. 79 What he does say is that the king of the Commentaries is Blackstone's creation, a product not of any context described as such, but of 'Blackstone's poetics'. His challenge lies in this assertion, and in its underlying claim that 'all political-legal arguments, like historical arguments, are at bottom imaginative constructions, bodied forth in words'. 80 The final essay in part three is a commentary on Paul Halliday's essay, but really it is a coda to the entire group -Dippel and Allen as well as Halliday. 100 The acquisition of sovereignty over foreign territory, said the High Court, was 'a prerogative act … of State the validity of which is not justiciable in the municipal courts'. 101 Rather, what was now shown then to have been false was the conventional wisdom used retrospectively in colonial New South Wales to validate settler tenures and titles -that by 'desart and uncultivated' Blackstone had meant uninhabited by a settled and civilised population. 102 The cruel distortion of the legal text discarded, the High Court stood ready to grant the text a new truth -that the common law had become 'the common law of all subjects within the Colony who were equally entitled to the law's protection as subjects of the Crown', colonist and indigene alike. Hence it stood ready to grant 'recognition by our common law of the rights and interests in Blackstone's original text had endorsed: the right of migration, or sending colonies to find out new habitations, when the mother country was overcharged with inhabitants … so long as it was confined to the stocking and cultivation of desart uninhabited countries' as 'within the limits of the law of nature'. But, he had there continued, 'how far the seising on countries already peopled, and driving out or massacring the innocent and defenceless natives, merely because they differed from their invaders in language, in religion, in customs, in government, or in colour; how far such a conduct was consonant to nature, to reason, or to christianity, deserved well to be considered by those, who have rendered their names immortal by thus civilizing mankind. Blackstone, above n 2, vol II, 7.
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land of the indigenous inhabitants of a settled colony', namely Australia. 103 But not so far as would 'fracture the skeleton of principle which gives the body of our law its shape and internal consistency', namely common law reception itself. 104 What stood in the Court's way was the obstinate reality of the 'history' of which 'our law is the prisoner', or in other words the reality of the crown's original extinguishing claim to beneficial ownership, and all the consequences that had flowed therefrom. 105 That formative reality the Court would not venture to question, 106 or compromise. 107 Thus exposed, history has proven to possess a 'tide' against which the High Court is disinclined to swim. 108
103
In [t]he evidence does not support a finding that the descendants of the original inhabitants of the claimed land have occupied the land in the relevant sense since 1788 nor that they have continued to observe and acknowledge, throughout that period, the traditional laws and customs in relation to land of their forebears. The facts in this case lead inevitably to the conclusion that before the end of the 19th century the ancestors through whom the claimants claim title had ceased to occupy their traditional lands in accordance with their traditional laws and customs. The tide of history has indeed washed away any real acknowledgment of their traditional laws and any real observance of their traditional customs. The foundation of the claim to native title in relation to the land previously
